I. INTRODUCTION
In Hudson v. Palmer, 1 the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that the fourth amendment does not protect prisoners from searches of their personal property by correctional officers. 2 The Court held that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells that must be protected by the fourth amendment. 3 Although several circuits have recognized that prisoners have a "limited privacy right" in their prison cells entitling them to the protection of the fourth amendment, 4 the Hudson decision eliminates any possibility that prisoners could invoke the fourth amendment to protect their property from search or seizure by state employees.
The Court in Hudson also extended its decision in Parratt v. Taylor 5 to intentional deprivations of property by state employees. 6 1 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) . 2 Id. at 3201. 3 Id. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. 4 Several circuits have held that. the fourth amendment guarantees prisoners the limited right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (search of the prisoner's cell and seizure of a package label identical to one found on a bomb was conducted reasonably for valid security reasons); United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (indiscriminate search and reading of prisoner's confidential papers violates the fourth amendment's standard of reasonableness where such reading was not necessary to further institutional security); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior notice of body cavity searches conducted on prisoners is not necessary where prison officials have reason to believe that the inmate is concealing contraband); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977)' (the court would not suppress evidence obtained in a prison search where probable cause existed and where the prisoner openly kept his property in his cell); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (shakedown searches may be conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or prisoner's consent; prisoner, however, may be entitled to compensation for the loss of his trial transcript where he can prove that the prison guards unreasonably seized his property).
5 451 U.S. 527 (1981) .
The Parratt Court held that prison officials who negligently destroy prisoners' property do not violate prisoners' property rights under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as long as the state provides postdeprivation remedies. 7 The Hudson decision further establishes that prison officials do not violate prisoners' fourteenth amendment rights even when they intentionally destroy prisoners' property. This Note will examine the reasoning that underlies the Court's unwillingness to grant a reasonable expectation of privacy to prisoners. This Note also will argue that the severity of the Supreme Court's decision is justified by the legitimate institutional interests of the penal facility.
II. BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment protects individual rights to privacy, but its protection is not available to all members of society under all circumstances. 8 Most notably, the fourth amendment is not available to pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners to prevent searches or seizures within their prison cells. 9 The Supreme Court laid the foundation for this restriction of prisoners' fourth amendment rights in Lanza v. New York 10 when the Court held that a prison is not an area protected by the Constitution. 1 The Lanza decision noted that because of the continual surveillance of inmates, a prison does not meet the expectation of privacy inherent in a home or an office. 12 Although the Court in Lanza was not required to decide the applicability of the fourth amendment to prison inmates, it stated that to give prisoners fourth amendment immunity from search or seizure of their personal property is "at best a novel argument."' 3
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States 14 and Smith v. Maryland' 5 established that the applicability of the fourth amendment is contingent upon whether the individual can claim that a "legitimate expectation of privacy" has been invaded by government actions. 16 Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz stated that the test of reasonableness for prison searches is "whether a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the kind of expectation that 'society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."' "17
The Supreme Court has determined the reasonableness of prison searches in several different ways. Prior to its decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 18 the Supreme Court applied a case-by-case test of reasonableness to searches conducted by state employees to determine whether they violated the fourth amendment.' 9 The Court decided the reasonableness of each search by balancing the need for the particular search against the personal rights that the search invaded.
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The Court in Bell, however, rejected the case-by-case reasonableness test. Instead, the Court determined the reasonableness of the contested searches in a categorical fashion. The Court argued that "when an institutional restriction infringes a specific constituconversation to interrogate the prisoner's brother before a legislative committee. The district court recognized that the Parratt decision, which held that a negligent deprivation of property by state officials does not violate the fourteenth amendment if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy exists, was applicable to the Hudson case. 43 The district court extended the holding of Parratt to a state employee's random and unauthorized intentional destruction of a prisoner's property. The court held that the postdeprivation remedies available to Palmer under Virginia state law afforded him with adequate means of redress for the lost property. [Vol. 75 dural due process. 4 9 The court found that Virginia's postdeprivation remedies provide parties whose rights are affected with a forum that addresses grievances, thus fulfilling the requirement of procedural due process that parties in interest be given a hearing. 50 Because of a factual conflict regarding whether Hudson conducted the search to harass Palmer, 5 ' the court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that Palmer was without any rights to privacy and remanded the case for further factual determinations.
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The court of appeals held that prisoners have a limited privacy interest, 55 and consequently that they are protected from unreasonable searches and unjustifiable confiscations. 5 4 Noting that the fourth and fourteenth amendments protect inmates from arbitrary and oppressive invasions of personal privacy that harass the prisoners and serve no legitimate institutional concerns, 5 5 the court concluded that prisoners should be stripped only of those constitutional rights that impair prison security or administration. 5 6 before negligent or intentional deprivations of property occur because the state cannot foresee when such acts will occur. Id. at 1223. 49 Id. The postdeprivation remedies available to prisoners in Virginia are state tort law and common law remedies. The Supreme Court in Hudson noted that Virginia has adopted a new inmate grievance procedure that will afford prisoners relief for any destruction of their property. 104 S. Ct. at 3202 n.9. (1974) . The Court stated that the possibility that contraband could be enclosed in correspondence represents a sufficient security threat to the prison to justify an infringement on any first amendment rights the prisoners may have in receiving their mail. Id. The Court will allow censorship of mail if it furthers the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. In another case, the Court held that limitations of first amendment freedoms must be no greater than are necessary or essential to the particular governmental interest involved. Martinez v. Procunier, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) .
The Supreme Court also has allowed restrictions on the free exercise of religion where the application of a state regulation is necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (imposition of social security taxes on Amish people who object on religious grounds to receipt of public benefits and to payment of taxes to support public benefit funds is not unconstitutional). Although the Supreme Court has not determined what restrictions can be placed on free exercise within prisons, the Seventh Circuit in Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th
The court of appeals acknowledged that spontaneous shakedown searches are an effective means of limiting the amount of contraband smuggled into prisons. 5 7 The court, however, identified only two situations in which prison officials may search the property of specific individuals in their cells. 58 First, prison officials may conduct random searches pursuant to an established program that is reasonably designed to deter or discover contraband. 59 63 First, the Court determined that a prison inmate has no "reasonable expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment." 6 4 Second, the majority found that intentional deprivations of property committed by state employees violate the fourteenth amendment due process clause if adequate postdeprivation remedies exist. 6 5 To determine whether the prison officials interfered with the inmate's privacy rights, the Court applied the test established in Katz Cir. 1983), upheld the practice of conducting frisk searches of male inmates by women, despite the fact that the practice violated the tenets of the inmate's Islamic religion. The Court stated that the prisoner could not "expect the same freedom from incidental infringement on the exercise of his religious practice that is enjoyed by those not incarcerated." id. at 958. To apply the Katz test, the majority in Hudson first looked at the circumstances of incarceration to determine whether prison inmates have a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells. 68 The Hudson Court concluded that because a prison "shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room,"
' 69 the fourth amendment right to privacy is "fundamentally inconsistent" 70 with prisoners' living situations. In the prison environment, inmates and their cells must be under close surveillance to ensure institutional security and internal order.
7 '
The Hudson Court found that the interest of prisoners in privacy within their cells must yield to the accepted belief that "loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement. ' 72 Next, the majority looked at the interests of society in maintaining the security of its penal institutions to determine whether society would accept a prisoner's expectation of privacy as reasonable. 7 3 The Hudson Court found that society places an obligation on prison administrators to provide an environment for inmates and prison employees that is both secure and sanitary. 74 In conjunction with this obligation comes the prison officials' authority to "take all necessary steps to ensure. . . safety" within the prison. 75 Because unfettered access to prisoners' possessions allows prison officials to detect contraband and thus reduce potential security problems, the majority held that society would not accept prisoners' expectation of privacy as reasonable. 7 6 A protectable privacy interest for prisoners would prevent prison officials from maintaining a secure prison. 
SUPREME COURT RE VIEW
The Hudson Court, therefore, concluded that prisoners' expectations of privacy cannot be deemed reasonable if society's interest in the security of its prisons outweighs the prisoners' interest in privacy within their cells.
7 7 The majority found that the court of appeals erred in holding that prisoners have even a "limited privacy right" in their cells. 78 The Hudson Court instead adopted a "bright line" rule that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells. 79 Accordingly, the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply within the confines of prison cells. 80 The second issue considered by the Hudson majority was whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt should extend to intentional deprivations of property by state employees acting under color of state law. 8 1 Guided by the fundamental goal of due process inquiries-providing an opportunity for an aggrieved party to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 8 2 -the Hudson Court applied the rationale underlying the Parratt decision to intentional deprivations of property. The Supreme Court found that because the state could not anticipate random and intentional unauthorized conduct by its employees, the state could not provide remedies before the deprivation occurs. 8 4 In prior decisions, this Court has noted that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." '8 5 Guided by this principle, the Hudson Court gave judicial notice to the impracticability of traditional predeprivation remedies when random and unauthorized deprivations occur, and it did not require such remedies. 8 6 The Hudson majority held that when states provide adequate civil remedies for deprivations that are committed by state employees, the procedural requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are fulfilled.87
The Hudson Court also refused to uphold the limitations placed on prison officials' use of random searches by the Fourth Circuit. 8 8 As a result of its concern over the possibility that searches would be conducted solely to harass inmates, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had required that prison officials conduct searches only when they followed an established policy or when they had a reasonable suspicion that prisoners were hiding contraband. 8 9 Concluding that the spontaneity of random searches increases their effectiveness, the Hudson majority rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision. 9 0 The Supreme Court held that any inquiries by prisoners into the reasonableness of prison searches need not be addressed by the Court because prisoners have no fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches that are conducted by prison officials in a penal institution. 9 1 Justice O'Connor concurred in part with the Hudson decision. Justice O'Connor agreed with the portion of the majority opinion that held that search and seizure of inmates' possessions is legitimate because incarceration eliminates individuals' fourth amendment rights to privacy and possessory interests in personal effects. Justice O'Connor argued, however, that prisoners' property is protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the fifth amendment takings clause. 93 These clauses mandate that the government provide due process of law and just compensation for any deprivations of property. 9 4 Finding, however, that Palmer had not demonstrated that Virginia's grievance procedure and state tort and common law remedies were inadequate means of compensation for the loss of Palmer's property, Justice O'Connor maintained that no valid constitutional claim existed. 9 5 Justice O'Connor thus agreed with the majority's holding.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that Palmer's complaint did not allege a violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process. 96 disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that society is willing to accept the total revocation of the right to privacy and the right to possessions that do not threaten the security of the prison.
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Justice Stevens argued that even without a reasonable expectation of privacy, Palmer's possessory interests in his belongings are protected by the fourth amendment. 9 8 Justice Stevens stated that the issue of reasonableness is inherent in fourth amendment inquiries and should be decided by "balancing the intrusion on constitutionally protected interests against the law enforcement interests justifying the challenged conduct." 99 Justice Stevens also noted that the prison official asserted "dominion and control" over Palmer's property as a result of "taking and destroying it."100 The dissent found that the prison official's conduct amounted to a seizure that the majority should have evaluated to determine its reasonableness. 1 0 1
To determine if the seizure was reasonable, the dissent balanced the prisoner's privacy interests against the institutional interests fulfilled by seizures. The dissent next weighed prison inmates' privacy interests. Justice Stevens found that nearly all correctional administrators discourage prison guards from either seizing or destroying noncontraband property 10 6 because institutional goals are not served when 97 Id. 98 Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 106 Id. at 3213 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated, "I am unaware that any responsible prison administrator has ever contended that there is a need to take or destroy noncontraband property of prisoners. . . . To the contrary, it appears to be the near-universal view of correctional officials that guards should neither seize nor destroy noncontraband property." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) . The dissent found authority for [Vol. 75 guards deprive inmates "of any residuum of privacy or possessory rights." 10 7 Without privacy, inmates lose their sense of individuality, they devalue themselves, and, consequently, they become more violent and resistant to rehabilitative efforts.' 0 8 Justice Stevens argued that denying fourth amendment protection against unreasonable seizures to prisoners declares that they "are entitled to no measure of human dignity or individuality" and reduces them to "little more than chattels."' 0 9 The dissent concluded by criticizing the majority for sacrificing the constitutional principle of protection of privacy rights for the sake of administrative expediency. The Court rejected the assertion that the fourth amendment could be invoked to protect the property of inmates from searches by prison officals.' 1 4 In Katz, the Supreme Court adopted the view that the interests protected by the fourth amendment were based only upon an invasion of privacy rights; privacy rights can be protected under the fourth amendment only when individuals have a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. 115 To determine Although prisoners retain some of their constitutional rights while incarcerated, 1 7 society is not willing to accept the idea that prisoners' expectations of privacy within their cells are reasonable. 8 18 The confinement of potentially violent and dangerous individuals poses an obvious threat to the safety of prison officials, visitors, and other inmates. 1 9 In order to minimize the threat, the Virginia legislature authorized the use of random shakedown searches, the seizure of contraband, and the continual surveillance of prison inmates. 120 Although not all searches of prison cells will lead to the confiscation of contraband, they will act as a useful preventative measure to reduce potential security threats. 12 1 Society accepts the loss of privacy as a natural incident of incarceration.
2
Consequently, society is not prepared to acknowledge that prisoners have a reasonable expectation of privacy because this expectation may reduce the level of internal order and security in penal held that "consistently with Katz. . . the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action. During the last decade, most federal courts erroneously concluded that the fourth amendment gives prisoners a "limited privacy right" that prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. 124 These decisions did not recognize that the retention of the constitutional right to privacy by prison inmates is inconsistent with the constant surveillance of prisoners that is characteristic of penal institutions. The Supreme Court in Wolffv. McDonnell held that although a prisoner's rights "may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."' 25 The Wolff majority, however, added that prisoners' rights may be restricted to accommodate the "institutional needs and objectives" of prisons.' 26 A prison's need to maintain internal security certainly justifies a restriction on prisoners' privacy rights.
In an environment where constant surveillance is "the order of the day,"' 2 7 any expectation of privacy maintained by prisoners is incompatible with the reasonable goals of the institution. 12 8 Unlimited access to the prisoner's personal belongings allows the prison officials to ferret out illegal drugs, weapons, or other contraband that may endanger the security of the prison.' 29 Consequently, seizure of contraband materials helps prison officials maintain a secure facility.
The Supreme Court's decision to eliminate entirely a prisoner's right to privacy is not wholly without precedent. Language from previous Supreme Court decisions suggests the result in Hudson. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish stated the "[i]t may well be argued that a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a person."' 3 0 The Lanza Court also doubted that the claim of the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable governmental interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) .
Society places its trust in government to ensure that these tasks are fulfilled. Any practice that limits prison officials' access to inmates' cells would be inconsistent with the completion of these tasks. In addition, the Supreme Court's approval of another more intrusive search technique suggests that the shakedown searches authorized by Hudson are neither an unprecedented and impermissible invasion of prisoners' fourth amendment rights nor an excessive response to the security needs of prisons. In 1979, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Woish upheld the practice of conducting routine body cavity searches of pretrial detainees following contact visits with individuals from outside the prison. 1 3 2 The Bell Court stated that body cavity searches were a way to discover and deter smuggling of weapons and drugs into the prison.' 3 3 The Court held that the searches were a reasonable response to legitimate security concerns, even though there had been only one reported attempt to smuggle contraband concealed in a body cavity into the prison. Because the body cavity searches were in response to prison security needs, the Court held that such searches were not excessive intrusions upon prisoners' fourth amendment privacy rights.
The shakedown searches at issue in Hudson cannot be considered as more excessive intrusions of privacy rights than the cavity searches upheld in Bell. The searches of prison cells involve only an interference with items of property, whereas cavity searches involve an examination of the internal areas of the human body. 13 The Supreme Court also based its decision in Hudson upon the prudent policy of permitting officials to exercise broad discretion in running the prisons. 140 Traditionally, courts afford wide-ranging deference to the security decisions made by prison officials. 14 1 The Supreme Court in Hudson was right to uphold the constitutionality of shakedown searches where the prison administrators use their discretionary power to order searches. In Bell, the Supreme Court held that it would not substitute its judgment on matters of institutional security and administration for that of "the persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running" of prisons.1 4 2 The Court realizes, therefore, that state prison administrators are in a better position than the judiciary to assess the need for security measures in their prisons.
Although the seizure and destruction of Palmer's noncontraband materials were unfortunate occurrences, these events do not refute the conclusion that prisoners have no fourth amendment privacy rights in their prison cells. Palmer's legal materials and correspondence were not items of contraband. 143 As such, the materials posed no threat to the prison's internal security.
14 4 The arbitrary seizure and destruction of noncontraband items achieve no reasonable institutional purpose. 14 5 The specific facts in Hudson, however, do not justify abandoning the practice of conducting random shakedown searches and seizures.
Without unrestricted access to prison cells, prison officials will be hampered severely in their efforts to seize dangerous items of contraband. 4 6 Prison officials must be able to react immediately to the daily security problems that arise in prisons. This objective would be "literally impossible to accomplish" if inmates retained a right to privacy in their cells. 14 7
Although the Hudson decision is broad, the Supreme Court is not condoning the destruction of materials that are in the legitimate possession of the prisoners. ChiefJustice Burger states that Hudson does not mean that prisoners are without any remedies "for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over inmates' property rights with impunity."' 48 Prisoners still may invoke the protection of the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment, various state tort and common law remedies, and grievance procedures within the prison. 14 9 Because a potential for abuse does exist as a result of the Hudson decision, state legislatures, not the judiciary, should enact stricter disciplinary actions against prison officials who seize and destroy inmates' noncontraband possessions. Restrictions on prison officials' access to prison cells, however, would be an extreme and unreasonable response to the possibility that abuses will occur.
B. EXTENSION OF THE PARRATT DECISION TO INTENTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY
The Court properly concluded that the random and unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.1 50 By extending its decision in Parratt to intentional deprivations of property, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the spontaneous nature of both negligent and intentional acts makes the predeprivation process "impracticable."' 15 1 The Court reached this conclusion because it found that states cannot anticipate or control the occurrence of such 146 Marrero, 222 Va. at 757, 284 S.E.2d at 811. 147 Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3200. 148 Id. at 3202. 149 Id. of property because the fourteenth amendment places the obligation on the state, not on the individual employee, to provide procedural due process for aggrieved parties. The Court in Hudson was right to extend its decision in Parratt to intentional deprivations of property by state employees where adequate postdeprivation remedies are available.
The postdeprivation remedies available to Palmer will compensate him for the destruction of his property. Virginia provides tort law remedies for property intentionally destroyed by state employees. 162 and within the scope of their employment, they act for the state, but if they act wrongfully the conduct is chargeable to them alone.' " Id. at 18, 155 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 228, 22 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1942)). Sovereign immunity, therefore, probably would not bar Palmer from recovering against Hudson.
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[Vol. 75 that may arise from improper, harassing searches in order to prevent fourteenth amendment violations.
